By Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Warwick

Initially published @ https://theconversation.com/

The process of removing Kenya’s deputy president Rigathi Gachagua is part of a long history, dating back to independence, of fallouts between the president and his deputy. The difference this time around is the process.

Historically, presidents have fired their deputies. But the adoption of a new constitution in 2010, saw the introduction of a process for impeachment – for both the president and the deputy – that’s run by the legislature. This is the first time it’s been used.

On 8 October 2024, members of Kenya’s national assembly voted to impeach Gachagua on grounds that included corruption, insubordination and ethnically divisive politics. The case now moves to the senate where members will hear the charges – and Gachagua’s defence – and vote.

If at least two-thirds of senate accept the charges, and Gachagua’s legal challenges fail, then Gachagua will make history as Kenya’s first deputy leader to be impeached.

So far, President William Ruto has stayed silent on the matter, but the process would not be proceeding without his blessing.

Amid the novelty of the impeachment process, it’s easy to forget that it is the norm for Kenyan presidents to fall out with their deputies. As a political scientist interested in Kenya’s ethnic politics and democratisation, I argue that this is because of how deputies are selected in the first place.

Deputies are initially selected largely on pragmatic grounds as people who bring something useful to a political alliance. This could be resources, a support base or a reputation for being a good technocrat or administrator.

They’re not usually people with whom the president has a strong and continuous personal relationship or someone with whom they share a clear political ideology. Neither are they usually someone who has made their way up through a political party.

This has brought about a long history of tensions and fallout between Kenya’s presidents and their deputies.

History of fallouts

Independent Kenya’s first vice president, Oginga Odinga, saw his ministerial portfolio gradually reduced by President Jomo Kenyatta. Kenyatta then replaced Odinga as vice president of the ruling Kenya African National Union (Kanu) in 1966 further undermining his powers. Soon after, Odinga joined the opposition Kenya’s People’s Union.

His successor, Joseph Murumbi, resigned within months. The official reason given was ill health, but it is widely believed that Murumbi was troubled by corruption and authoritarianism within the Kenyatta regime.

Kenya’s second president, Daniel arap Moi, elected Mwai Kibaki as his first deputy. Kibaki was dropped after a decade. He went on to form an opposition party as soon as Kenya shifted to multi-party politics in 1992.

Moi’s second vice president, Josephat Karanja, resigned after a year to avoid a vote of no confidence for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government.

Moi’s third deputy, George Saitoti was sidelined to pave way for Uhuru Kenyatta’s nomination as the party flagbearer in 2002. Moi’s final deputy, Musalia Mudavadi, fell with the rest of the Kanu government in the 2002 elections.

As Kenya’s third president, Kibaki similarly oversaw a regular change of guard. His first deputy, Michael Wamalwa, died after a few months in office. His second, Moody Awori, lost his seat in the 2007 election.

Kibaki’s third deputy, Kalonzo Musyoka, joined the president during Kenya’s post-election violence of 2007-08. He left at the end of his term in 2013 to run with Raila Odinga in the 2013, 2017 and 2022 presidential elections.

Kenya’s fourth president, Uhuru Kenyatta, was the only leader to have the same deputy, William Ruto, for his full term as president – from 2013 to 2022. However, relations between Kenyatta and Ruto were hardly rosy. The two fell out after the 2017 elections as Kenyatta teamed up with long-standing opposition leader, Raila Odinga. Ruto beat Odinga, Kenyatta’s favoured candidate in the 2022 elections.

Lessons to learn

Because deputies are selected for their practical value, the person who made a good deputy at one point in time can come to be seen as a liability or threat as the political context changes.

For example, at independence, Oginga Odinga made an excellent ally for Jomo Kenyatta. He had some resources and was a proven mobiliser. He brought a support base. However, within a few years, Odinga became a problem for the president as a more radical faction within the ruling party coalesced around him.

Similarly, Ruto made an excellent ally for Uhuru Kenyatta when they both faced charges for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court. The two fell out once Kenyatta had won his second and final term, and Kenyatta turned to his succession.

Gachagua was useful to Ruto in 2022. He had personal wealth, was an effective mobiliser and hailed from central Kenya where the election looked to be won or lost. However, once elected, Gachagua’s populist statements and reputation for ethnic bias became more of a liability.

Second, as contexts change, someone else can soon come to be seen as more useful as second in command.

For Jomo Kenyatta, Moi had shown his utility and loyalty during the “little general elections” of 1966, which effectively sidelined the Kenya People’s Union and Oginga Odinga.

Kithure Kindiki, Kenya’s interior cabinet secretary, is the current frontrunner to replace Gachagua. He is seen as better able to negotiate with the international community, especially during a critical economic period for Kenya as it seeks new International Monetary Fund loans.

Third, being the country’s vice or deputy president comes with a lot of opportunities to network. These interactions have often led individuals to be seen as a growing threat, or as actively plotting against the president. They may also be seen as a future challenger.

History has shown that there is no ideal way of dealing with such a potential challenger, leading subsequent presidents to try different approaches.

Current context

Ruto and Gachagua have clearly fallen out. Their differences became apparent soon after the 2022 elections. However, they came into sharp relief in the face of anti-tax protests in June 2024. There were subsequent allegations that Gachagua and some of his allies had helped to finance the protests.

The question, therefore, isn’t why they have fallen out but why Gachagua is being impeached now.

Ultimately the answer to this can only be known by a few individuals. But perhaps an indication of the answer lies in the emotions the fallout has stirred: a desire to distract the public and show that the government is taking action to deal with Kenya’s ongoing economic crisis. There may also be a desire to undercut Gachagua before he can build national networks.

Ruto has the numbers in the senate to see the impeachment process through. But this is a dangerous game. Those sidelined have a habit of coming back to haunt their former allies.

At the moment, most Kenyans are supportive of the impeachment process, but many also feel that Gachagua is being unfairly targeted especially in central Kenya, where a majority oppose the process.

While a successful impeachment might see Gachagua barred from holding public office, this wouldn’t necessarily mean an end to his career as an effective political mobiliser.

The next few months – and the narratives that emerge about why Ruto and Gachagua fell out – will be critical in determining both their futures.

: Kenya’s recent election to the United Nations Human Rights Council for the 2025-2027 term has sparked significant debate, with civil society organizations expressing strong opposition due to the country’s troubling human rights record. While the Kenyan government sees the council seat as an opportunity to enhance its global influence and advocate for African interests, critics argue that its internal challenges, including police brutality and shrinking civic space, undermine its credibility in human rights advocacy. This development raises critical questions about the balance between Kenya’s international ambitions and the urgent need for domestic reforms.

By Charles Wachira

On October 9, 2024, Kenya was elected as one of the 18 members of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for the 2025-2027 term, a decision welcomed by the government but met with significant skepticism from civil society organizations. This move highlights a complex interplay between Kenya’s aspirations on the global stage and the serious human rights challenges it faces domestically.

Aspirations Versus Reality

Kenya’s successful bid to join the UNHRC is part of a broader strategy to enhance its international influence and leadership in promoting human rights, particularly in the East African region. However, civil society groups in Kenya have expressed their discontent, arguing that the nation’s track record on human rights raises serious questions about its suitability for such a role.

Critics point to ongoing issues like police brutality, extrajudicial killings, and the repression of dissenting voices, which have marred Kenya’s human rights landscape. Reports from reputable watch dogs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have highlighted these concerns, asserting that the Kenyan government has failed to hold security forces accountable for their actions during political unrest.

The Case Against Kenya’s Bid

Civil society organizations have vehemently opposed Kenya’s UNHRC seat bid, arguing that the country’s human rights record disqualifies it from taking a leading role in global human rights advocacy. Key concerns include:

1. Freedom of Expression: There has been a noted crackdown on dissent and freedom of expression in Kenya. Activists have documented cases of harassment, intimidation, and arbitrary arrests of journalists and human rights defenders. This environment contradicts the principles of open discourse and accountability that the UNHRC is supposed to uphold.
2. Shrinking Civic Space: The Kenyan government has increasingly restricted the operations of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups. These restrictions, perceived as government efforts to stifle criticism, have raised alarms about the viability of civil society in holding the government accountable.
3. Gender Equality and Minority Rights: Despite some progress, issues surrounding gender equality and the rights of marginalized communities remain pressing concerns. The failure to implement the two-thirds gender rule and ongoing discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals highlight the gaps in Kenya’s human rights commitments.
4. Corruption: Widespread corruption within the government undermines the protection of citizens’ rights and erodes trust in government institutions. Activists argue that until corruption is addressed, Kenya lacks the credibility to advocate for human rights internationally.

The Benefits of UNHRC Membership

Despite the criticism, the Kenyan government views its election to the UNHRC as a significant achievement with various potential benefits:

1. Enhanced Diplomatic Influence: Being part of the UNHRC provides Kenya with a platform to shape global human rights policies, particularly those affecting Africa. This could enhance its standing as a key diplomatic player on the continent.
2. Advancing African Interests: A seat on the council allows Kenya to represent and advocate for human rights issues pertinent to Africa, such as post-conflict reconstruction and justice for victims of war crimes.
3. Reinforcing Global Commitments: Holding a seat showcases Kenya’s commitment to multilateralism and global governance. It presents an opportunity to engage with the international community on human rights issues.
4. Economic and Developmental Partnerships: Aligning with global human rights standards can attract development aid and investments from international partners who prioritize governance in their foreign policy.
5. Incentivizing Domestic Reforms: Some advocates suggest that international scrutiny from UNHRC membership could pressure the Kenyan government to address its domestic human rights challenges, potentially leading to significant reforms.

Looking Ahead: A Path to Reconciliation?

Kenya’s election to the UNHRC has ignited a vital discussion about the country’s human rights challenges versus its global aspirations. As the government prepares to assume its responsibilities, the significant opposition from civil society cannot be overlooked.

The outcome of this bid could serve as a catalyst for positive change or deepen the rift between the government and civil society. If Kenya can leverage its position to address its internal issues, it may fulfill its ambition of becoming a leader in global human rights advocacy. Conversely, failure to do so may raise questions about the credibility of its commitment to human rights, both domestically and internationally.

Ultimately, the journey ahead will require balancing national interests with the urgent need for reforms that align with the principles of human rights that Kenya is now expected to champion on the global stage. As Kenya embarks on this new chapter, the hopes of its civil society for meaningful change hang in the balance.

Keywords:Kenya:UN Human Rights Council:Civil Society:Human Rights Record:Global Advocacy

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: Kenya launches a $20M Holistic Productive Capacities Programme with UNCTAD to drive economic growth, boost diversification, industrialization, and private sector empowerment.

By Charles Wachira

Kenya held consultations with key development partners on October 3, 2024, to discuss the implementation of its ambitious Holistic Productive Capacities Development Programme (HPCDP), designed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 

This initiative aims to reshape Kenya’s economic landscape and pave the way for long-term sustainable growth. 

Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi, along with other senior government officials, led discussions with donors, UN representatives, the private sector, and key stakeholders.

 The dialogue opened a new chapter in Kenya’s drive toward economic transformation. 

“This programme is a turning point for Kenya’s future,” remarked Paul Akiwumi, UNCTAD’s Director for Africa, Least Developed Countries, and Special Programmes.

 “It’s about laying the groundwork for a stronger economy by empowering people, businesses, and institutions to innovate, compete, and thrive.”

 A New Economic Paradigm With Kenya’s past commodity-driven growth models proving insufficient to ensure inclusive and sustainable development, the HPCDP comes at a critical time.

 Despite achieving growth rates exceeding 5% over the 15 years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic, the country continues to face challenges, with poverty and economic vulnerability still widespread. Kenya’s Vision 2030 hinges on bridging the country’s productive capacities gap.

 The consultations focused on how this programme will address core issues, such as underdeveloped industrialization and vulnerability to economic shocks, that have held back poverty reduction and job creation.

 The Holistic Productive Capacities Development Programme The HPCDP, a bold 10-year initiative set to launch in 2025, is designed to enhance economic diversification, industrialization, infrastructure, and private sector growth.

 The programme aims to transform Kenya from an economy reliant on low-productivity sectors to one driven by innovation and high-value industries.

 Five key pillars will drive the programme: 

Economic diversification and value addition Infrastructure development and environmental sustainability ICT for digital transformation Private sector growth and empowerment Skills development and policy coordination Securing Funding and Strategic Focus The consultations aimed to secure $20 million in funding over the next decade to support these transformative goals.

 Discussions centered on how Kenya can harness its strengths in agriculture, manufacturing, and technology while aligning with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to enhance its global competitiveness.

 The Role of the Private Sector At the heart of the HPCDP is private sector empowerment. The programme focuses on supporting micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), improving the business environment, and attracting both domestic and foreign investment.

 By leveraging Kenya’s rapid infrastructure developments in transport, logistics, and energy, the country aims to become a regional hub for manufacturing and value-added processing.

 A Collaborative Effort UNCTAD’s expertise in trade, investment, and technology for sustainable development will be central to the success of this initiative. A high-level steering committee and technical task force will oversee the programme’s implementation, ensuring seamless coordination and effective execution.

 Looking Forward The October 3, 2024, consultations mark a significant step forward in Kenya’s efforts to achieve its Vision 2030 goals and transform its economy into one that thrives on innovation and productivity. With robust international collaboration and a clear strategy, Kenya is positioning itself for a future of sustainable growth and prosperity. 

About UNCTAD: The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is committed to promoting inclusive and sustainable development through trade and investment. With a broad membership, it empowers countries to use trade for economic growth and development.

Keywords:Kenya economic growth: Holistic Productive Capacities Programme: UNCTAD partnership Kenya: Industrialization and diversification: Private sector empowerment Kenya